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Digest: Kleffman v. Vonage Holdings Corp.
Molly S. Machacek
Opinion by Chin, J., with George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter,
Werdegar, Moreno, and Corrigan, JJ.
Issue
Does the transmission of e-mail advertisements from
multiple domain names, with the intent of bypassing a spam
filter, violate a state statute regulating falsified header
information in commercial e-mail advertisements?
Facts
Craig E. Kleffman had received eleven unsolicited email
advertisements from eleven different domain names that all
advertised Vonage and its broadband telephone service.1 While
none of the domain names specified Vonage as its sender, instead
using
such
domain
names
as
“superhugeterm.com;
formycompanysite.com;
ursunrchcntr.com;
urgrtquirkz.com;
countryfolkgospel.com;
lowdirectsme.com;
yearnfrmore.com;
openwrldkidz.com; ourgossipfrom.com; specialdlvrguide.com; and
struggletailssite.com,” each of them can be traced back to the
same physical address.2
Subsequently, Kleffman filed a class action lawsuit against
Vonage Holdings Corporation.3 He asserted a claim under
section 17529.5(a)(2) of the Business and Professions Code, which
“makes it unlawful to advertise in a commercial e-mail
advertisement that ‘contains or is accompanied by falsified,
misrepresented, or forged header information.’”4
A traditional Internet service provider (ISP) uses domain
names to identify a sender, and then can use the spam filter to
block high volumes of advertisements from a particular sender
before it reaches the inbox of an ISP client.5 Additionally, a
client can label a certain sender as spam, which will serve to
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Kleffman v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 232 P.3d 625, 627 (Cal. 2010).
Id. at 627.
Id.
Id. (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17529.5(a)(2) (West 2010)).
Id.
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block future e-mails from that sender or company.6 Kleffman
asserted in his lawsuit that if Vonage had sent their
advertisements from the same single e-mail address, then it
would have been less expensive and time consuming than using
multiple domain names.7 He further contended that Vonage’s
only reason for e-mailing from multiple addresses was to
intentionally bypass the spam filters of ISPs and that it was a
deliberate strategy to trick the email provider and the client.8
Kleffman alleged that “[t]he multitude of ‘from’ identities falsifies
and misrepresents the true sender’s identity and allows
unwanted commercial email messages to infiltrate consumers’
inboxes,” and therefore that it would “constitute falsified and
misrepresented header information prohibited by section
17529.5(a)(2).”9
Vonage removed the case to federal court, and the district
court granted their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under the code section 17529.5(a)(2), without leave to amend.10
The district court held that Kleffman did not claim that the
content of the e-mails from Vonage was false or forged, and while
the headers did not specify that the sender was Vonage, they
were truthful in their identification of the sender.11 The plain
language of the statute requires falsified headers, and it does not
prohibit failing to send e-mails from a single domain name.12
The court also found that if such conduct were prohibited by the
statute, then it would be preempted by the federal “CAN-SPAM
Act,” so it is not for the court to decide.13 Kleffman appealed, and
under California Rules of Court rule 8.548,14 the Ninth Circuit
asked the California Supreme Court to decide the question: “Does
sending unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisements from
multiple domain names for the purposes of bypassing spam
filters constitute falsified, misrepresented, or forged header
information under [section] 17529.5(a)(2)?”15
Analysis
The court found that the central issue was the scope of
section 17529.5(a)(2), and what is unlawful regarding “falsified,
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Id. at 627–28.
Id. at 628.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 628 n.3. See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7713 (2006).
Kleffman, 232 P.3d at 628 n.4.
Id. at 628.
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misrepresented, or forged header information.”16 The court
reasoned that the essential goal in statutory interpretation is to
establish the legislative intent in order to determine the purpose
of the law, especially in terms of language choice.17 The court
noted that the parties agreed on certain subjects, such as the fact
that domain names are considered part of e-mail header
information for the purposes of the statute.18 The court also
found no dispute that the e-mails were from Vonage or that the
domain names used were accurate and fully traceable back to
that company.19 There was no dispute that the question in this
case was whether or not the e-mails in question contained
falsified or misrepresented header information under the
statute.20
The court found that the dispute centered on the language of
the statute and the meaning of the word “misrepresented” as it
applies to header information.21 Vonage contended that the
header information would need to be “a false representation of
fact” in order to be misrepresented.22 The court looked to
Cooley v. Superior Court, which articulates the rule of statutory
construction that courts should give meaning to every word in
the statute, if possible, and should avoid surplusage.23 The court
applied this reasoning to the instant case in order to determine if
falsified and misrepresented had different meanings under the
statute, and found that the legislature must have meant the
words to have separate meanings.24 Kleffman asserted that
header information, defined as “source, destination and routing
information,” is unlawful under the federal CAN-SPAM Act if it
is materially false or misleading, and that the same definition
should be applied in this case.25 However, this definition was not
adopted during the legislative process behind adopting section
17529.5(a)(2).26 The court rejected Kleffman’s assertion that
“misrepresented” should be given the meaning that was used in
Business and Professions Code sections 17200 and 17500, which
prohibit advertising that is “likely to mislead or deceive, or is in
fact false,”27 or the meaning from a “lay” dictionary that defines
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17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Id.
Id. (citing People v. Cole, 135 P.3d 669, 674 (Cal. 2006)).
Id. at 628–29.
Id. at 629.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Cooley v. Superior Court, 57 P.3d 654 (Cal. 2002)).
Id. at 629.
Id. at 629 n.5 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 7704(a)(1), 7702(8) (2010)).
Id. at 629 n.5.
Id. at 629–30 (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500, 17200 (West 2010)).
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misrepresent as “[t]he act of giving a false or misleading
statement about something.”28 The court found that
“misrepresented” and “misleading” had been given different
meanings by the legislature, and that if the legislature had
intended to use “misleading,” then they would have done so.29 In
fact, the court found that the legislature already used “likely to
mislead” separately in the next provision of the same statute,
showing that the legislature used the terms differently.30
The court found that the legislative history for the statute
was relevant to the issue, but that it did not support Kleffman’s
position.31 The legislative history, as interpreted by the court,
“reflects a careful and purposeful distinction between the terms
‘misrepresented’ and ‘misleading.’”32 An amendment made to the
bill contained revised language that recognized the linguistic
difference between section 17529.5 subsections (2) and (3).33 The
court held that they “must avoid interpretations that would
render related provisions unnecessary or redundant.”34
Furthermore, Kleffman based his interpretation of the legislative
history on a letter written by the legislative author of the bill and
its amendment, which showed intent to prohibit multiple e-mail
addresses to avoid a spam filter.35 The court rejected this
argument because the letter was not part of the Legislative
discussion leading up to the creation of the statute.36
The court further found that if the legislative history is read
to prohibit a domain name that did not clearly state the true
identity of the sender, it would raise significant problems for
federal preemption by the CAN-SPAM Act.37 If a state law
attempted to require further restrictions or labels on e-mail
headers, it would undoubtedly be preempted by federal statute.38
The court found that a single e-mail with an “accurate and
traceable domain name” does not have misrepresented or
falsified header information within the meaning of the statute
simply because the domain name is “random,” “varied,”
“garbled,” and “nonsensical,” as argued by Kleffman.39 Adopting
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Id. at 629 n.6.
Id. at 630.
Id. (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17529.5(a)(3)).
Id. at 631.
Id. at 632.
Id. (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17529.5(a)(2), (a)(3)).
Id. at 632.
Id. at 634.
Id.
Id. at 632–33 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1) (2006)).
Id. at 633.
Id.
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a practice that prohibits multiple and random domain names,
from the same original company, would be overly difficult and
impractical.40 Additionally, violating section 17529.5(a)(2) is a
misdemeanor that allows for up to six months in prison, so the
court was reluctant to add uncertainty to the language of the
statute.41
Finally, the court noted that in passing section 17529.5(a)(2),
the legislature remarked on spam filters and their potential
limitations.42 However, it found that such limitations do not
justify altering the meaning of “misrepresented . . . header
information” in the language of the statute.43
Holding
The court answered the question of law under California
Rules of Court rule 8.548.44 It held that, generally, commercial email advertisements sent from multiple domain names with the
intent to bypass spam filters were not made unlawful by section
17529.5(a)(2).45 The court held that the emails in question did
not contain or include any misrepresented header information.46
Therefore, since the statute only governs falsified,
misrepresented, or forged header information, the statute in
question did not regulate the electronic advertisements, and the
e-mails sent by Vonage were not unlawful.47
Legal Significance
The court’s decision prevents a flood of potential litigation
from other members of the public who are annoyed, unhappy, or
bothered by the amount of commercial e-mail advertisements
that they receive on a daily basis. The statute in question only
governs and punishes those who send falsified or fraudulent
emails. While consumers may continue to be bothered by e-mail
advertisements that their spam filters cannot catch, it is not for
the court to contort the language that the legislature chose to
use.
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Id. at 634.
Id. (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17529.5(c) (West 2010)).
Id. at 635.
Id.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 633.
Id.

